







Working Paper no. 76    
 
 
The (long) run out of unemployment  































Laboratorio R. Revelli, Collegio Carlo Alberto  Tel. +39 011 670.50.60 - Fax +39 011 670.50.61 
Via Real Collegio, 30 - 10024 Moncalieri (TO)  www.laboratoriorevelli.it - labor@laboratoriorevelli.it 
 
                             LABOR is an independent research centre of the Collegio Carlo Alberto The (long) run out of unemployment:
are temporary jobs the shortest way?￿
Fabio Berton
LABORatorio R. Revelli - Collegio Carlo Alberto
Abstract
A higher job creation is a common result by many theoretical ap-
proaches trying to model marginal labor market reforms. In the frame-
work proposed by Berton and Garibaldi [2006], in particular, the equilib-
rium arrival rate of temporary job o⁄ers is expected to be higher than the
arrival rate of permanent ones. In this paper I use a sample of prime aged
male workers from WHIP in a competing risks framework in order to com-
pare the duration of unemployment spells terminated by jobs that only
di⁄er in their formal duration. I ￿nd that the arrival rate of ￿xed term
jobs is actually larger than the arrival rate of permanent ones; this result
is robust to the main sources of unobserved heterogeneity. However, the
average duration of unemployment in Italy is still very high and the lib-
eralization of ￿ exible contracts as a policy to reduce it did not completely
solve the problem.
Key words: temporary jobs, unemployment duration, competing
risks
1 Introduction
In the last decade the Italian labor market has been progressively liberalized
through a long sequence of reforms. The introduction at the margin of new la-
bor contracts with very limited or even no employment protection has been the
leading feature of basically all of them. The purpose of this kind of strategy was
to improve the employment opportunities as long as to reduce the unemploy-
ment rate. Following Bertola [1990], lower ￿ring costs lead to a higher workers￿
turnover - and therefore to a higher expected arrival rate of job o⁄ers, a higher
destruction rate and a lower unemployment duration - but have no e⁄ect on
the average employment level. More recent approaches try to face directly the
issue of marginal reforms. The results are quite homogeneous. In the model
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1by Blanchard and Landier [2002] ￿rms only post temporary vacancies and after
a period they decide whether to retain the worker on a permanent basis or to
post another new vacancy; the destruction rate of temporary jobs increases with
the EPL gap between permanent and temporary workers and simulations show
that also the arrival rate of temporary job o⁄ers increases after the reforms; an
excessive workers￿turnover, however, may even result in a higher equilibrium
unemployment rate. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay [2002] instead assume that only
permanent contracts exist; however, an exogenous share of them may be inter-
rupted at ￿rm￿ s will and at no cost after the ￿rst period. A higher share of
contracts with no ￿ring costs - a way to model the marginal reforms - increases
both the job creation and the job destruction, thus leading to a higher workers￿
turnover. Finally, Berton and Garibaldi [2006] provide a model in which ￿rms
face a trade-o⁄ between the ex-ante job ￿lling rate and the ex-post ￿ exibility:
temporary contracts prevent ine¢ cient workforce retention, but the waiting time
to ￿ll a temporary vacancy is longer. From the workers￿standpoint this means
that temporary jobs imply both a higher arrival rate of job o⁄ers and a higher
destruction rate. The average unemployment duration decreases, but - as in the
paper by Blanchard and Landier - its equilibrium level may even increase.
A higher arrival rate of job o⁄ers after the reforms - and thus a lower average
unemployment duration - is a common result of all the theoretical approaches
brie￿ y depicted so far. The model by Berton and Garibaldi, in particular, shows
that in equilibrium the arrival rate of temporary job o⁄ers is higher than the
arrival rate of permanent ones. The purpose of this paper is to check whether
this result holds in the Italian labor market. Using a sample from WHIP of
male unemployed workers strongly attached to the formal labor market in a
competing risks framework, I ￿nd that the hazard rate of exit to temporary jobs
is higher than to permanent ones. This result is stronger among the workers who
receive the unemployment bene￿t, which is in line with the theoretical model.
However, the unemployment duration is in absolute terms still very long, even
for the workers moving to a non-standard job. As long as the liberalization
of ￿ exible jobs was expected to soundly reduce the unemployment duration,
therefore, it seems that much work is still to be done.
The existing empirical literature supports these conclusions. Bover and
Gomez [2004] use the Spanish labor force survey and show that the exit rates
to temporary jobs are ten times larger; Van Ours and Vodopivec [2006], with
Slovenian administrative data, ￿nd a positive correlation between the unem-
ployment duration and the probability of ￿nding a permanent job. Finally,
Blanchard and Landier [2002] ￿nd that in France the higher arrival rate of job
o⁄ers had almost no e⁄ect on the unemployment duration.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data and the sampling
strategy, section 3 presents the econometric model and its speci￿cation, section
4 includes the results and section 5 the discussion. Section 6 concludes.
22 The data
WHIP is a dataset of individual work histories built up by LABORatoro R.
Revelli from the social security administration (INPS) archives1. The reference
population includes all the employees of the private sector, temporary workers
from the public administration, craftsmen, traders, collaborators, professionals
without an autonomous security fund and bene￿t recipients (unemployment
and collective dismissals). WHIP also takes into account retirement but is not
able to distinguish among unsupported unemployment, non-participation and
unobserved employment spells (basically, permanent civil servants and irregular
workers). Careers are observed monthly and the observed series cover the period
1985 - 1999.
Since my purpose is to measure the duration of unemeployment, I sample
all the separations occurred from January to November 1998. The month of
December has been excluded because the ￿rm data series end in 1998, and
possible (unobserved) merges and buyouts occurred between 1998 and 1999
may be the origin of spurious separations. The distance between each individual
separation and the beginning of a new job is the object of my analysis; through
direct access to raw individual data, the censoring time is at December 2002.
In order to identify proper unemployment spells I also exclude the indi-
viduals who have a high probability of non-participation or of unobservable
employment: women (who may decide to stop working in order to take care of
the children; see Berton and Pacelli [2007]), people working in the South (where
the black economy is widely di⁄used), seasonal workers (who have a sort of
"natural" employment cycle), temporary employees of the public sector (who
are more likely to move to a permanent job in the public administration) and
individuals aged under 20, over 40, retired or moving to retirement. Job-to-
job transitions (a possible signal of voluntary separations2) and non-employees
(whose data are poorer and in some cases less reliable) have been dropped too.
Finally, when more than one separation for the same individual is observed, only
the last one enters the sample3. It includes 4095 individuals (3560 uncensored
unemployment spells) and 75727 person-period observations (see below).
2.1 Some descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows that this prime-aged sample is young on average (67% was at
most 30 years old at separation) and works mainly in northern regions. Most
of the workers saparated from a full time permanent job, thus con￿rming that
open end contracts do not prevent workers from losing their jobs (see Berton et
al. [2007]); the share of full time ￿xed term arrangements, however, is all but
1See www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip for further details.
2I de￿ne a job-to-job transition as a new job that begins within the ￿rst month after the
separation. Almost 67% of the job-to-job movers ￿nd a full time permanent job, while this
share is only 42% in my sample.
3Since seasonal workers have been dropped and in 1998 there is no change in the busi-
ness cycle (the Italian GDP has been growing from 1996 to 2001), the calendar time of the
separation shouldn￿ t be relevant for the probability of ￿nding a new job.
3Table 1: Who￿ s in the sample?
Age class No. of obs. Col. perc. Contract at separation No. of obs. Col. perc.
20 - 25 1608 39.3 Full time open ended 2452 59.9
26 - 30 1129 27.6 Part time open ended 259 6.3
31 - 35 769 18.8 Full time ￿xed term 579 14.1
36 - 40 589 14.3 Part time ￿xed term 70 1.7
Full time CFL 276 6.7
Work area No. of obs. Col. perc. Part time CFL 13 0.3
Full time apprenticeship 338 8.3
North-west 1614 39.4 Part time apprenticeship 6 0.1
North-east 1366 33.4 Other (supported, TWA) 102 2.6
Center 1115 27.2
Source: analysis on WHIP data
negligible. Finally, 18% of the sampled workers (728 individual observations)
receive an unemployment bene￿t after the separation; this information will turn
out to be relevant later in the paper.
The average unemployment duration (Table 2) is long - at least one year
- even when censored observations are dropped from the sample (column 2).
It increases with age, but once censored observations are dropped, the trend
becomes U-shaped, possibly meaning that more mature individuals either ￿nd a
job quickly or prefer/are forced to stay unemployed longer. As far as the labor
contract at separation is concerned, then, two aspects are worth a comment:
part time workers display longer duration, possibly meaning that they are less
attached to the labor market4; on the contrary, CFLs enjoy the lowest waiting
time.
The main concern of the paper, however, is on the contract at destination.
Columns 3 and 4 compare two contracts that only di⁄er with respect to their
formal duration, i.e. full time permanent and full time ￿xed term (see the
speci￿cation strategy); as expected, irrespective of the age and the work area,
non-employment duration is longer for workers moving to a permanent job, the
only exception being for individuals aged between 31 and 35. The waiting time
in the temporary submarket, anyway, is all but short.
3 The econometric strategy
3.1 The Model
The problem is that of a single duration T (unemployment) which is terminated
by exit to one out of an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive possible destinations
(the di⁄erent types of jobs) described by the subscript m = 1;:::;M. One
way of formulating a duration model with multiple destinations is to postulate
the existence of M independent latent durations T1;:::;TM and to assume that
unemployed workers enter the shortest of them, so that what one observes is T =
4For most of them, working part time is a matter of choice [ISTAT 2005]. Maybe, they
prefer non-participation or unemployment to full time jobs.
4Table 2: Average unemployment durations (months)
Overall mean No censored obs. To FT perm. To FT ￿xed term
Age class
20 - 25 17.8 13.4 14.1 12.6
26 - 30 18.4 12.8 13.0 12.3
31 - 35 18.2 12.6 12.3 13.3
36 - 40 20.8 13.1 12.4 11.2
Work area
North-west 18.2 13.2 13.4 12.6
North-east 18.2 12.2 12.1 11.7
Center 19.3 13.9 13.8 13.2
Contract at sep.
Full time CFL 16.3 11.8 13.9 7.8
Part time CFL 20.0 14.2 15.8 13.0
Full time temp. 18.2 13.2 12.9 12.1
Part time temp. 18.1 14.1 11.5 14.0
Full time perm. 18.6 12.9 12.8 12.7
Part time perm. 21.1 14.9 16.7 15.0
Full time app. 16.6 12.3 12.5 12.4
Part time app. 36.5 27.0 24.0 32.5
Source: analysis on WHIP data
Min(T1;:::;TM;TC), where TC is the latent time for right-censored observations.
Lancaster [1990] shows that in this framework the transition intensities
hl(t) = lim
dt!0
Prft ￿ T ￿ t + dt;Dl = 1jT ￿ tg
dt
i.e. the probability of departure to state l in the short interval (t;t+dt) condi-
tional upon survival to t, can be given the interpretation of a hazard rate.
In the following I will use this competing risks approach. I assume that the
data are intrinsecally discrete, i.e. that exits to employment occurs in monthly
cycles described by the index k. As shown by Jenkins [2005], the contributions
to the likelihood funtion for an individual surviving j cycles read














for uncensored spells terminated by an exit to state l, and
LC = S(j)
for censored observations, where S(j) is the probability of surviving for j cycles.




















































where ￿l is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual exits
to the lth state.
Allison [1982] suggests a straightforward method for the estimation of the
discrete time competing risks model depicted above. He assumes a logistic












and shows that the resulting likelihood function takes the same form of the
likelihood of a multinomial logit applied to a person-period reorganised dataset.
Since the multinomial logit model implies independence across the destinations,
hl(j) reads as a hazard rate.
3.2 Speci￿cation issues
In the observed period plenty of di⁄erent temporary contracts were available on
the Italian labor market [Tronti et al. 2003]. In order to compare arrangements
that only di⁄er with respect to their formal duration and to avoid possible cost-
related confounding e⁄ects, I focus my attention upon unsupported full time
open end and unsupported full time ￿xed term contracts5. The probability
in (1) is therefore speci￿ed with M = 3, including "other labor contracts" as
the residual alternative. As for the individual characteristics, Jenkins [1995]
suggests to include in matrix X
￿ a set of individual covariates (age, unitary wage, actual previous experi-
ence, local unemployment rate, work area, ￿rm size, industry and dum-
mies for welfare provisions); in my speci￿cation X is time-invariant and
captures the individual characteristics at separation;
￿ a set of time-dummies such that dt = 1[T = t], in order to identify the
shape of the destination-speci￿c baseline hazard in a non-parametric way.
What I expect is that the baseline hazard of exit to a ￿xed term job is
higher than the one to a permanent. Since in a multinomial logit framework each
5In the following simply "￿xed term" and "open end" or "permanent".
6coe¢ cient read as the partial e⁄ect of the covariate on the log-odds ratio between
destination l and the reference exit, I expect the exponentiated coe¢ cients of
the time-dummies to be larger than one for destination l = ￿xed term when full
time open end contracts are the normalizing state. Formally:
exp(￿dt;ljl=fixed term) > 1
The speci￿caton depicted so far su⁄ers from two major limitations: unob-
served heterogeneity is not controlled for and the alternative destination states
are assumed to be independent. Both of them can be tackled using a mixed












where ￿ is an individual and destination speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponent. Following Haan and Uhlendor⁄ [2006], ￿ is independent of the set of
observables X6, is identically and independently distributed across the individ-
uals and follows a trivariate normal distribution with mean a and unrestricted
variance covariance matrix W








which allows for correlation among the destination states.
In order to estimate model (2) - with proper individual speci￿c e⁄ects - a
panel of repeated unemployment spells should be observed. Through WHIP
data at the moment this is not possible; employment spells, de￿ned as a contin-
uative relationship between a worker and an employer, can be identi￿ed only up
to 1998, since ￿rm data are no more available from 1999 onwards. In addition,
the information about the legal duration of the contract (open end, ￿xed term
or seasonal) appears only from 19987.
This notwithstanding, the person-period structure of the data still allows to
have repeated observations for the same individual and thereofore to identify
the mixed logit model. The estimation procedure, however, is computationally
burdensome even when using Halton sequences as suggested by Haan and Uh-
lendor⁄ themselves. For this reason, and for the moment, I will present only
the results from model (1), and I will furtherly discuss the main sources of
unobserved heterogeneity in section 5.
6To the best of my knowledge, removing the hypothesis of orthogonality between X and ￿
requires to assume a simpler dynamic structure, such as a Markov chain [Magnac 2000]. Since
the purpose of my analysis is measuring a duration, I won￿ t follow this strategy.
7This is the reason why I chose to sample the ￿ow of 1998 separations.
74 Results
4.1 The e⁄ect of the covariates
Table 3 reports the partial e⁄ects of the individual characteristics as they are
observed at the moment of separation. Previous actual experience decreases
the log-odds ratio of exit to a ￿xed term job; the local unemployment rate,
working in a North-eastern region and holding a temporary contract before the
separation have in turn a positive e⁄ect. None of these results is unexpected:
after a su¢ cient experience in the labor market, in fact, one is expected to ￿nd
her own personal stable job; this is coherent with Gagliarducci [2005] who ￿nds
that past experience - whatever the labor contract - increases the probability
of ￿nding a permanent job. Many reasons, then, stand behind a positive cor-
relation between the unemployment rate and temporary jobs: for instance, a
higher unemployment rate may be a signal of bad business, so that ￿rms are
less capable or willing to invest in a long run employment relationship; in addi-
tion, it also means that more individuals are seeking for a job (the labor market
tightness is lower), and that ￿rms use more temporary arrangements in order
to screen them. As for the work area, Berton and Pacelli [2007] observe a larger
share of temporary jobs in North-eastern regions than in the North-west, where
permanent contracts are instead more di⁄used. Finally, Berton et al. [2007] and
Picchio [2006] show that state dependence in the labor contracts a⁄ects Italian
working careers, which explains the strongly positive e⁄ect of "￿xed term con-
tract" and "trainees or apprentices" respectively on the log-odds of exit to ￿xed
term jobs and to other contracts8.
The e⁄ects of the other signi￿cant determinants are more puzzling. The
workers who separated from a small ￿rm have a lower probability to get a ￿xed
term contract. As long as they move to another small ￿rm, two facts may be
relevant: ￿rst, open end contracts are less binding for small ￿rms and their
opportunity cost is smaller9. In addition, small ￿rms seem to prefer other types
of temporary arrangements, such as collaborations [ISTAT 2004]; the coe¢ cient
for the exit to other jobs is in fact signi￿cant and larger than one. Unfortunately,
the ￿rm data are no more available after 1998, so that I￿ m not able to control for
the size at destination. Also workers from the constructions sector display low
odds ratios of exit to ￿ exible jobs. Since most of the transitions occur within
the same sector, I can assume that they move to another job in that sector,
where many temporary positions are informal and therefore unobservable.
On the contrary, the unemployment bene￿t positively a⁄ects the odds ratios
of exit to a ￿xed term job. This is somehow surprising, since the unemployment
bene￿t should allow the unemployed workers to wait for better job opportunities;
one should therefore expect longer unemployment spells and exits to stable
8The residual destination "other jobs" includes both CFL contracts and apprenticeship.
9Small (meaning with at most 15 employees) and large ￿rms in Italy face di⁄erent rules
in case of unfair layo⁄s (i.e. without the "just cause"). Small ￿rms simply have to pay the
worker a compensation (from twice to ten times the last wage if the worker￿ s tenure was larger
than ten years), while large ones - in addition to the compensation - are forced to re-hire the
worker.
8Table 3: The e⁄ect of the covariates
No. of obs.: 75727 LR chi2 (108): 1299.79
No. of individ.: 4095 Pr > chi2: 0
Exit to ￿xed term jobs Exit to other jobs No exit (cens. obs.)
exp(￿) Pr > z exp(￿) Pr > z exp(￿) Pr > z
Part time 0.940 0.773 1.716* 0.000 1.363* 0.004
Age (years in 1998) 0.996 0.697 0.950* 0.000 0.999 0.885
Montlhy wage 1.000 0.983 1.000 0.331 1.000 0.666
Previous exp. (months) 0.995* 0.000 0.999 0.507 0.996* 0.000
Collaborator in 1997 2.058 0.147 1.528 0.293 1.345 0.359
Collaborator in 1998 1.587 0.430 1.429 0.438 1.205 0.617
Unemp. rate in 1998 1.050* 0.037 1.047* 0.005 1.048* 0.000
North east 1.449* 0.006 1.322* 0.002 1.257* 0.000
Centre 1.271 0.098 1.158 0.146 1.128 0.100
Small ￿rm (< 20) 0.779* 0.026 1.238* 0.006 1.036 0.520
Constructions 0.537* 0.000 0.726* 0.002 0.762* 0.000
Services 0.984 0.896 0.927 0.379 0.933 0.272
White collars 0.991 0.956 1.596* 0.000 1.365* 0.001
Managers 0.664 0.711 0.390 0.249 1.712 0.166
Fixed term contract 2.664* 0.000 1.262* 0.036 1.214* 0.018
Trainees or apprent. 1.867* 0.000 2.424* 0.000 1.551* 0.000
Sickness bene￿t 1.030 0.854 0.948 0.639 0.979 0.789
Coll. dismissal bene￿t 1.657 0.551 5.786* 0.000 1.599 0.269
Severance payment 1.674 0.219 1.292 0.402 1.288 0.269
Ord. unemp. bene￿t 1.849* 0.001 1.218 0.130 0.947 0.559
Red. unemp. bene￿t 2.338* 0.000 0.993 0.958 0.832 0.062
* signi￿cant at 95% level
Note: relative risk ratios; exit to permanent contracts is the baseline outcome
positions. This is not the case in Italy. Possibly due to the low amount of the
bene￿t (30% of the wage for at most six months) and to the administrative
controls that force to accept the ￿rst suitable job opportunity10, the recipients
display shorter durations [Berton and Pacelli 2007] and a higher probability to
move to ￿xed term jobs.
Finally, some comments about the exit to the residual destination are in
order. The state dependence in the labor contracts explains the positive e⁄ect
of the "part time" variable and age is likely to capture di e⁄ect of experience.
Tax and social fees rebates, then, induce the ￿rms to hire collectively dismissed
workers, who therefore move to some form of supported jobs.
4.2 The time dummies
Table 4 shows that in any moment during an unemployment spell the arrival rate
of a ￿xed term job is higher than the arrival rate of a permanent one, meaning
that whatever the amount of time one has already spent in unemployment, the
expected waiting time for a ￿xed term job is lower than for a permanent job.
This result is coherent with the theoretical priors discussed in the introduction.
However, only three out of ￿fteen time-dummies coe¢ cients are statistically
signi￿cant.
10Following the model by Berton and Garibaldi, this should indeed be a temporary one.
9Table 4: The duration dependence structure
No. of obs.: 75727 LR chi2 (108): 1299.79
No. of individ.: 4095 Pr > chi2: 0
Duration of unemp. Exit to ￿xed term jobs Exit to other jobs No exit (censored obs.)
(months) exp(￿) Pr > z exp(￿) Pr > z exp(￿) Pr > z
2 1.049 0.864 0.996 0.979 0.470* 0.000
3 1.477 0.191 1.337 0.112 0.370* 0.000
4 1.197 0.529 0.594* 0.005 0.247* 0.000
5 1.527 0.138 0.644* 0.023 0.277* 0.000
6 1.331 0.344 0.863 0.443 0.292* 0.000
7 1.522 0.173 0.719 0.114 0.325* 0.000
8 2.299* 0.004 0.854 0.439 0.301* 0.000
9 1.142 0.692 0.770 0.214 0.299* 0.000
10 1.101 0.763 0.807 0.273 0.225* 0.000
11 2.293* 0.006 1.113 0.604 0.278* 0.000
12 1.532 0.213 1.046 0.838 0.307* 0.000
13 - 15 1.400 0.234 0.732 0.087 0.395* 0.000
16 - 18 1.184 0.571 0.986 0.939 0.370* 0.000
19 - 24 1.447 0.156 0.784 0.138 0.369* 0.000
25 - 30 1.854* 0.044 0.843 0.415 0.698* 0.016
* signi￿cant at 95% level
Note: relative risk ratios; exit to permanent contracts is the baseline outcome
The ￿rm size at destination and the unemployment bene￿t after the separa-
tion are likely to a⁄ect these estimates. As already mentioned before, open end
contracts are less binding for small ￿rms, since ￿rm-initiated separations are
not prevented. Small ￿rms have therefore a lower incentive to use ￿xed term
contracts; as a consequence, the expected arrival rate of permanent jobs could
be overestimated by the presence of open end contracts that do not involve a
long-run committment. WHIP data, anyway, do not allow at the moment to
control for the ￿rm size at destination.
Another major source of possibly confounding e⁄ects is the unemployment
bene￿t. Bene￿t recipients are subject to administrative controls that force them
to accept the ￿rst suitable formal job opportunity; this is actually in line with
the assumptions of the model in the previous chapter, where any job is always
preferred to unemployment. Non-recipients, on the contrary, are more free to
refuse a job, to tune the search e⁄ort, to move to non-participation or even
to work in the informal market. When estimating destintion-speci￿c transition
intensities one should therefore control for such di⁄erences. Table 5 reports
the coe¢ cients of the time dummies as interacted with a control for the un-
employment bene￿t. As expected, in the recipients subgroup all (but one) the
coe¢ cients for exit to ￿xed term jobs are signi￿cant and far larger than one,
while among non-recipients the estimated coe¢ cients are instead larger than
one but in general not statistically signi￿cant.
Table 6 shows that subsample selection does not explain these results. The
unemployment bene￿t recipients display higher age, experience, monthly wage
and a larger share of full time permanent workers; the local unemployment
rate, the ￿rm size and the share of workers coming from North-eastern regions
are instead roughly the same. The individual characteristics therefore induce a
10Table 5: The duration dependence structure: bene￿t recipients vs. non-
recipients
No. of obs.: 75727 LR chi2 (108): 1311.50
No. of individ.: 4095 Pr > chi2: 0
Duration of unemp. Exit to ￿xed term jobs Exit to other jobs No exit (censored obs.)
(months) exp(￿) Pr > z exp(￿) Pr > z exp(￿) Pr > z
Recipients
2 - 3 2.715* 0.011 1.280 0.367 0.614* 0.018
4 - 6 2.704* 0.001 0.626* 0.038 0.195* 0.000
7 - 9 3.087* 0.000 0.999 0.998 0.174* 0.000
10 - 12 3.574* 0.001 1.102 0.737 0.262* 0.000
13 -18 3.590* 0.001 1.252 0.428 0.400* 0.000
19 - 24 4.186* 0.002 0.957 0.909 0.510* 0.013
25 - 30 3.232* 0.034 0.520 0.205 0.534* 0.041
Beyond 2.169 0.117 0.905 0.768 0.799 0.338
Non-recipients
2 - 3 1.332 0.309 1.070 0.669 0.388* 0.000
4 - 6 1.357 0.269 0.703* 0.028 0.281* 0.000
7 - 9 1.676 0.070 0.720 0.057 0.345* 0.000
10 - 12 1.622 0.086 0.932 0.667 0.254* 0.000
13 -18 1.244 0.447 0.786 0.144 0.366* 0.000
19 - 24 1.441 0.214 0.749 0.098 0.340* 0.000
25 - 30 1.970* 0.050 0.891 0.607 0.706* 0.033
* signi￿cant at 95% level
Note: relative risk ratios; exit to permanent contracts is the baseline outcome
higher transition rate of the unemployment bene￿t recipients towards permanent
jobs, so that the result of a higher ￿xed term jobs arrival rate is even reinforced.
4.3 Uneasy vs. stable workers
In this section I simulate the probability time pattern of two hypothetical work-
ers, using the results from Table 5. I compare a typical uneasy pro￿le - a trainee
aged 20 with a small experience and small wage - with a more stable one, a thirty
years old white collar who separated from a standard full time job after a quite
long tenure (Table 7 provides a full description of the two simulated workers).
Provided that one has been unemployed up to time t and conditional to be
an unemployment bene￿t recipient or not, the uneasy worker always displays a
lower probability to persist in unemployment (Figure 1). This result is consistent
with the model from the previous chapter. The stable worker is likely to have a
higher reservation outside utility and places a lower value upon ￿nding a new
job more quickly; in other words, he can wait longer, for a more suitable job
opportunity. The gap disappears for very long durations.
With respect to the unemployment bene￿t, the di⁄erences gather at dura-
tions between three and twelve months. The non-recipients pro￿le is ￿ atter,
while recipients display a more typical U-shaped time dependence, possibly
meaning that either non-recipients are actually less attached to the labor mar-
ket and many of them unobservably exit to non-participation, or that they are
11Table 6: Recipients vs. non-recipients: the individual characteristics
Characteristics at separation Recipients Non-recipients
Mean age (years) 30.2 27.7
Mean actual experience (months) 60 46.4
Monthly wage (1998 Euros) 1123.5 947.7
Local unemployment rate (%) 6.9 6.9
Work area (%) North-west 33.1 40.8
North-east 34.8 33.1
Centre 32.1 26.1
Firm size (workers) 484 469.8
Labor contract (%) Full time open end 63.7 59.0
Full time ￿xed term 19.0 13.1
Full time CFL 5.8 7.0
Part time open end 5.4 6.5
Ful time apprent. 1.2 9.6
Other 4.9 4.8
Table 7: Two pro￿les: uneasy vs. stable workers
Characteristics at separation Uneasy worker Stable worker
Age 20 30
Previous experience (months) 24 72
Worked as collaborators No No
Local unemployment rate (%) 7.0 7.0
Work area North-west North-west
Firm size > 20 > 20
Contract at separation Trainee Open ended
Part time at separation No No
Sector at separation Manifacturing Manifacturing
Occupation Blue collar White collar
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Figure 1: Probability of unemployment persistence
instead more likely to exit to unobservable jobs, for instance in the black econ-
omy. On the contrary, unemployment bene￿t recipients may be more attached
to the formal labor market: they start searching for a formal job right after the
separation, so that their exit rate initially increases with time; as time goes by,
the share of less endowed individuals in the unemployment pool increases, and
the exit rate starts decreasing. In addition, search e⁄ort is likely to be maxi-
mized at the end of the bene￿t, which explains the peak at six-to-nine months
durations.
Anyway, the most outstanding fact from Figure 1 is the dramatically high
persistence in unemployment. Averaging over the four pro￿les, after twelve
months less than 30% of the simulated population ￿nds a job, of any type;
even within the observed prime-aged male sample I used for the estimates, this
statistics is less than 55%. This means that any strategy aimed at reducing
the unemployment duration - as the liberalization of temporary contracts was
actually intended - would be of primary relavance from the labor market policy
standpoint.
For the uneasy worker (Figures 2 and 3) the exit rates to a non-standard
job are actually larger: on a population of 100 of them with (without) the
unemployment bene￿t, after 12 months 8 (4) have joined a ￿xed term job, 9
(7) a permanent one and 20 (16) the residual category. This last destination
includes both the apprenticeship and CFL contracts, and the result is thus
consistent with the state dependence described by Berton et al. [2007]. On
one hand it means that the simple higher arrival rate of ￿xed term job o⁄ers
is not su¢ cient to overcome the e⁄ect of the individual characterisitics, of the
state dependence, of possible port-of-entry contracts (as CFLs actually seem to
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Figure 2: Probability of exit to a new job: uneasy worker with UB
have in using less costly arrangements. On the other, that the uneasy worker,
in order to have a higher probability - but not decisive for a sound reduction
of the unemployment duration - to ￿nd a job, must accept a less protected job
and run the trap-risk.
For the stable worker (Figures 4 and 5) permanent jobs are slightly more
likely and exits to ￿xed term contracts are almost negligible: out of a simulated
population of one hunderd of them with (without) the unemployment bene￿t,
after one year 12 (10) have gone to an open end contract, 13 (9) to the residual
category and only 4 (1) to a ￿xed term job. In this case both persistence,
individual characteristics and the higher reservation outside utility play a role,
but, again, the exit rate from unemployment seems to be really low.
5 Discussion
The main issue in discussing the results I got so far is unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to formally take it into account a mixed multinomial logit model with an
individual random e⁄ect should be estimated. As discussed earlier, however, this
procedure is computationally burdensome; the estimation is currently running,
but the results are not yet ready.
This notwithstanding, unobserved heterogeneity can still be discussed through
other instruments. First of all, Dolton and Van der Klaauw [1999] ￿nd that the
speci￿cation with the time-dummies is not only robust to the misspeci￿cation
of the duration dependence shape, but also to unobserved heterogeneity. Sec-
ond, since the main source of unobserved heterogeneity is probably individual
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Figure 5: Probability of exit to a new job: stable worker without UB
to be underestimated. Indeed, the most endowed individuals are more likely to
￿nd a permanent job, and to ￿nd it more quickly11; as time goes by, therefore,
the sample is left with the less endowed individuals that instead have a higher
probability to exit to a temporary job. Other relevant unobserved sources of in-
dividual heterogeneity are non-labor income and personal wealth. On one hand
rich individuals can a⁄ord longer waiting times in order to ￿nd the job they
like; as long as they look for a stable position, the arrival rate of ￿xed term jobs
would be overestimated. On the other, personal wealth and non-labor income
are positively correlated with individual ability; from this respect, the arrival
rate of ￿xed term o⁄ers would therefore be underestimated. Underestimation,
￿nally, occurs also if small ￿rms are more prone to o⁄er permanent positions
that can be interrupted through a severance payment.
In addition, one has to consider that formal econometric approaches only
allow to control for random e⁄ects; thus, the estimation of a mixed multinomial
logit model does not allow to control for ability or individual wealth, which
in turn are very likely to be correlated to the observed covariates. In sum, I
therefore expect unobserved heterogeneity to a⁄ect the estimates but not the
claim of a higher transition intensity to ￿xed term jobs.
Anyway a lower expected waiting time for a ￿xed term job also occurs when
￿rms only open temporary vacancies in order to reach their optimal mix of
permanent and temporary workers. This is probably what happened in Spain
during the nineties, when 90% of new hires have been signed under a temporary
arrangement [Dolado et al. 2002]. Analogously, Berton and Pacelli [2007] ￿nd
that in Italy in 1998 most of the entrants (about 50%) found a temporary job;
11ISTAT [2006] ￿nd that education - the usual proxy for ability - is positively correlated with
the probability to ￿nd a permanent job and negatively with the duration of unemployment.
16however, only less than 12% signed a ￿xed term contract (including both part
time and supported ones) while 27% is the share of new unsupported permanent
workers. In the sample I used for the present paper the distribution is even more
disproportionate: 12% of the observations exit to a full time ￿xed term job, and
37% to a full time open end one. Neither labor demand considerations, therefore,
seem to a⁄ect the main conclusions of this paper.
From the labor market policies point of view a higher arrival rate of tem-
porary job o⁄ers is of primary relevance. The reforms that took place since
the mid-Nineties were intended - among the others - to create more job op-
portunities for the young workers and to reduce the unemployment duration, a
problem a⁄ecting Italy from decades. This paper does not include a counter-
factual analysis, so that I￿ m not in a position to properly evaluate the reforms.
However, the simple descriptive statistics at the beginnig of the paper and the
simulations I run show that after the reforms persistence in unemployment is
still very high, a result found also by Blanchard and Landier [2002] for France.
6 Concluding remarks
In the last decade the Italian labor market has been liberalized through the in-
troduction of more ￿ exible labor contracts. The new contracts deeply loosen the
employment protection legislation upon new hires. The theory shows that from
the workers￿standpoint a reduction at the margin of ￿ring costs should result in
a higher turnover, a higher job arrival rate and a lower unemployment duration,
which actually are some of the goals of the reforms. The model proposed by
Berton and Garibaldi [2006] - in particular - shows that after the liberalization
a higher arrival rate of temporary jobs should be expected.
The purpose of this paper is to check this last implication. I use a sample of
prime-aged male workers from WHIP in a discrete time competing risks frame-
work and I compare the arrival rate of job o⁄ers that only di⁄ers with respect
to their formal duration. The estimates show that at any moment during an
unemployment spell the arrival rate of ￿xed term job o⁄ers is larger than the
arrival rate of permanent ones, meaning that the expected waiting time for a
￿xed term job is actually lower. This result turns out to be robust to the major
sources of unobserved heterogeneity. However, descriptive statistics and simple
simulations show that workers in the temporary market still face very long un-
employment spells, meaning that from the labor market policies point of view
much work is still to be done.
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